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THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON: A CAUTIONARY TALE
FOR CCS, HYDROFRACKING, GEOENGINEERING AND
OTHER EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS
MARK A. LATHAM*
[N]either the industry’s nor the federal government’s
approaches to managing and overseeing the leasing and
development of offshore resources have kept pace with rapid
changes in the technology, practices, and risks associated
with the different geological and ocean environments being
explored and developed for oil and gas production.1
INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation in the energy sector has resulted in
remarkable feats to produce the fossil fuels that power the global econ-
omy, such as the ability to locate and produce oil from reserves thou-
sands of feet beneath the ocean’s surface.2 Similar technical prowess
allows for the recovery of natural gas from deep within subsurface shale
formations.3
Evolving technological innovation also provides a measure of opti-
mism so that we can adequately respond to and mitigate, to some extent,
anthropogenic climate change arising from the emission of greenhouse
gases (“GHGs”) into our atmosphere,4 which may be the most pressing
* Deputy Vice Dean, Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I am grateful to Paige Davis,
Vermont Law School Class of 2013, for her outstanding research assistance in the prep-
aration of this Article.
1 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING 251 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT], available at http://www
.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident
_FINAL.pdf.
2 See WILLIAM L. LEFFLER ET AL., DEEPWATER PETROLEUM EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION:
A NONTECHNICAL GUIDE 155–56 (2003).
3 See Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2011, at A1.
4 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 111TH CONG., ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE:
RESEARCH NEEDS AND STRATEGIES FOR INT’L COORDINATION 1–2 (Comm. Print 2010)
[hereinafter ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE].
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environmental problem to ever confront humankind.5 Thus engineers have
turned a focus toward technological solutions to capture and store GHGs
so they will no longer be emitted into the air with the expectation that this
technology, carbon capture and sequestration, will become widely employed
in the not-too-distant future.6 Other technological solutions to address the
adverse consequences associated with climate change through a variety
of geoengineering proposals are also under consideration.7
However, as illustrated by the largest oil spill in U.S. history, the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which raged for months, technological in-
novation such as deepwater oil exploration and production also presents
unintended major threats to human health and the environment.8 If these
risks are not properly understood, evaluated, regulated, and worst-case sce-
narios prepared for well in advance, then catastrophe can and will strike.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill provides a potent cautionary tale,
which informs us that we need to tread carefully and thoughtfully when
we employ either existing or new technologies that can have a profound and
perhaps lasting impact on the environment.9 To do otherwise only serves
to invite repeated catastrophic events that can cost lives, adversely affect
the environment, and have far ranging negative implications for ecosystems
that can take decades to fully comprehend.10
Mindful of this cautionary tale, and building on prior work examin-
ing the failure to adequately regulate deepwater drilling,11 I consider here
the human and environmental tragedy of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill as a lens to explore three other innovative technologies that present
potential significant risk to human health and the environment. These
technologies include carbon capture and sequestration, a method to re-
duce atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide,12 hydraulic fracturing, an
5 See, e.g., David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global
Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 76 (2009).
6 See Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 211, 213 (2009).
7 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 65–66.
8 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at viii–ix.
9 See id. at vii.
10 See id. at vi, xi.
11 See Mark A. Latham, Five Thousand Feet and Below: The Failure to Adequately Regulate
Deepwater Oil Production Technology, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 341 (2011).
12 See KELSI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41371, GEOENGINEERING:
GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 10 (2011) [hereinafter BRACMORT ET AL.].
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increasingly controversial method for natural gas production13 and, lastly,
geoengineering, which has not been deployed on a major scale, but is un-
der serious consideration to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate
change through the deployment of a variety of interventions to actually cool
the earth’s temperature or to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.14
This Article first discusses the technological issues surrounding the
BP Deepwater Horizon and summarizes how regulator and industry reli-
ance on an inadequate fail-safe device played a crucial role in this disaster.
Next, I discuss the fundamentals of carbon capture and sequestration, hy-
draulic fracturing, and geoengineering; that is, I attempt to capture what
they involve, followed by the environmental and human health risks they
present. I then summarize the current or proposed regulation of these tech-
nologies and analyze whether those regulations are sufficient to adequately
protect human health and the environment. I conclude with recommen-
dations for policymakers and regulators to consider in light of these rapidly
unfolding technologies that, it is hoped, will provide guidance to minimize
the risks associated with each of them.
I. THE SEARCH FOR OIL AND THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
The Deepwater Horizon was a floating high-tech miracle of the
seas and an illustration of how far oil exploration and production technol-
ogy have advanced.15 In the early days of the oil industry exploration and
production activities were confined to land.16 Technological innovations
gradually moved oil exploration and production efforts from terrestrial-
based operations to the oceans, in particular to the deep waters of the
Gulf of Mexico.17
13 See Angela C. Cupas, Note, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why We Must Regulate
Hydraulic Fracturing at the Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605,
606 (2008).
14 See ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 4, at 1–2.
15 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at viii.
16 See LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 25.
17 See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEEP WATER: WHERE THE
ENERGY IS 2 (2004), available at http://www.boemre.gov/Assets/PressConference11152004
/MSGlossySingle_110404.pdf (“With declining production from its near-shore, shallow
waters, energy companies have focused their attention on oil and gas resources in water
depths of 1000 feet and beyond. Their progress in developing these resources has made
the Gulf of Mexico the focal point of deep water oil and gas exploration and production
in the world.”).
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:31
A. Overview of Deepwater Oil Exploration and Production
Initially these efforts to locate and produce oil from the oceans
were limited to relatively shallow waters, measured in the tens or per-
haps hundreds of feet in depth, due to technological limitations.18 This
changed when Placid Oil attempted to recover oil located more than 1500
feet below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico.19 Although Placid Oil eventu-
ally abandoned the well associated with this first deepwater oil production
attempt,20 this effort represented an important milestone for the offshore
oil industry.21 It was the first time that a floating, rather than a fixed, plat-
form was used in offshore oil exploration and production.22 Thus, the in-
dustry was freed from the limitations associated with fixed platforms, and
this technological innovation led to a variety of floating exploration and
production platforms that opened up the deep waters of the oceans to oil
production,23 including the Gulf of Mexico, the location of the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.24
Successfully producing oil from the deepwater first requires find-
ing promising sites where substantial oil reserves may be located.25 Here,
too, advanced technology plays an important role.26 To locate oil so deep
beneath the sea-floor three-dimensional seismic technology is used, which
involves vessels with equipment that can transmit sound waves to produce
a three-dimensional picture of the ocean floor.27 This three-dimensional
picture, in turn, is evaluated for geological features that are consistent with
the presence of subsurface oil.28 If there are geological features suggestive
18 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at viii.
19 LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 30.
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 See id. at 90. For a discussion of the different types of floating platforms that make
deepwater oil exploration and production feasible see id. at 89–106.
24 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 51.
25 LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 35.
26 See John T. Cuddington & Diana L. Moss, Technological Change, Depletion, and the U.S.
Petroleum Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1135, 1136 (2001).
27 See LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 40 (“Seismic data, especially 3D data, is one of a hand-
ful of vital enablers that has made deepwater exploration so rewarding. No one ever knows
what will turn up when the drill bit hits total depth, but seismic [data] provides a quantum
leap in improving probability of success before the well is drilled. With deepwater wells
running up to $100 million, that’s important.”).
28 Id. at 46.
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of oil, then a “wildcat,” or preliminary, well is drilled to confirm the pres-
ence of oil.29
Other technological advances have occurred in the oil and gas
industry, along with floating platforms and three-dimensional seismic
capability, and these other innovations have also played an important
role in allowing the industry to reach oil located under thousands of feet of
water and then thousands of feet beneath the ocean floor.30 The Macondo
well, which was the source of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, was not
only in 5000 feet of water but went another 13,000 feet beneath the ocean
floor and even deeper wells have been placed offshore.31 Drilling for oil and
gas in deepwater thousands of feet beneath the sea floor is technically
demanding,32 and to do so not only requires floating platforms and three-
dimensional seismic capabilities but also sophisticated drilling technology.33
B. The Primary Risk of Deepwater Oil Exploration and
Production Technology
The oil that is found in the depths at which deepwater exploration
and production operations are conducted is under tremendous pressure.34
If well pressure control is not adequately maintained a “blowout” will occur,
spewing oil and gas into the ocean, as was vividly illustrated by the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.35 Consequently, “[p]ressure control sits at the
top of the list of worries for the drilling engineer,”36 and during drilling
operations pressure is controlled through the injection of a heavy fluid,
called drilling mud, into the drill pipe.37 This prevents the uncontrolled
29 See id. at 46–48.
30 See Cuddington & Moss, supra note 26, at 1136 (“Technological advances such as three-
dimensional seismic techniques, polycrystalline diamond compact drill bits, horizontal
drilling, and offshore platforms capable of operating in hostile, deep-water environments are
widely acknowledged to have had significant impact on [oil exploration and development].”).
31 See Joel K. Bourne, Jr., The Deep Dilemma, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2010, at 40, 44 (“BP’s
Macondo well, in about 5000 feet of water and reaching another 13,000 feet beneath the
sea-floor, wasn’t particularly deep. The industry has drilled in 10,000 feet of water and to
total depths of 35,050 feet—the latter a world record set just last year by the Deepwater
Horizon in another BP field in the Gulf.”).
32 See LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 57–58 (“[D]rilling a well in 1500 ft of water is com-
parable to standing on top of the Sears Tower trying to stick a long straw in a bottle of
Coke sitting on South Wacker Drive.”).
33 See Cuddington & Moss, supra note 26, at 1136.
34 See John K. Borchardt, Avoiding the Blowout, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Aug. 2010,
at 40.
35 See id.; see also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at ix.
36 LEFFLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 58.
37 See Borchardt, supra note 34, at 40.
36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:31
escape of oil through the well as it is drilled;38 once the well is completed,
the drilling mud is replaced with cement and a brine solution that main-
tains well pressure control.39 As a related pressure control method, the
well casing is cemented at the bottom, to seal the area between rock and
casing,40 and as an additional pre-production pressure control mechanism,
a cement plug is added to the well.41 All throughout the drilling process,
pressure is monitored in the event that emergency measures are required
to prevent a runaway well from releasing substantial quantities of oil into
the ocean.42
With any technology it is important to have at least one fail-safe
mechanism in place, if not redundant fail-safe systems, in the event the
potential risks associated with a particular technology become realized.
This is especially true with deepwater oil exploration and production tech-
nology because the depths at which operations are conducted do not allow
for direct human intervention.43 Thus a highly reliable fail-safe device,
if well pressure control is lost, is critical to avert a catastrophic oil spill.44
The fail-safe mechanism recognized by the oil and gas industry in
the event that the potential primary risk associated with deepwater oil
exploration and production—loss of well pressure control—became an
actuality is a device referred to as a “blowout preventer,”45 in particular
the device’s “shear rams.”46 Indeed, by applicable regulation at the time
of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, those conducting oil exploration
and production activities in the Gulf of Mexico were required to have blow-
out preventers in place as a last resort pressure control mechanism.47
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 41.
42 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 91–92.
43 See Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises to New Levels as Oil Rigs in Gulf
Drill Deeper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at A1 (“[B]ecause the wells are deeper than human
divers can go, oil companies must rely on remote-controlled submarines to maintain their
equipment or perform repairs.”).
44 See generally id.
45 See Borchardt, supra note 34, at 41 (“Massive pieces of equipment called blowout pre-
venters are designed to close valves and use shear rams to seal the drill pipe and well casing
to block oil and gas from escaping the wellbore. They are the third and final defense against
a blowout.”).
46 See id. (“[S]hear rams cut through and crush the pipe and then form a seal. . . . The ram
blades also seal against each other forming a barrier blocking fluid flow.”).
47 See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.401(a), 250.440 (2010) (requiring, respectively, operators to “[u]se
the best available and safest drilling technology” feasible and mandating the use of
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Since they were deemed by the oil and gas industry and regulators
as the fail-safe device of choice to regain pressure control, it is important
that blowout preventers possess as high a degree of reliability as humanly
possible. As a fail-safe device, however, to prevent major oil spills in deep
water, blowout preventers leave much to be desired.48 Importantly, the
limitations of blowout preventers as fail-safe devices were well known to
regulators and the industry.49
First, well before the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred,
several reports pointed out significant problems with consistent reliability
of blowout preventers.50 In 1999, for instance, the Minerals Management
Service (“MMS”) commissioned a study by the Norwegian research group
SINTEF to evaluate the reliability of blowout preventers.51 More than 100
blowout preventer failures at eighty-three deepwater wells were studied,
and fifty-seven percent were labeled “safety critical failures.”52 In another
study, WEST Engineering Services was retained by MMS in 2004 “to
answer the question ‘Can a rig’s blowout preventer (BOP) equipment shear
the pipe to be used in a given drilling program at the most demanding con-
dition to be expected, and at what pressure?’ ”53 This was a crucial question
to answer because “[t]he well control function of last resort is to shear pipe
and secure the well with the sealing shear ram. As a result, failure to shear
when executing this final option would be expected to result in a major
safety and/or environmental event.”54
Second, blowout preventer technology apparently failed to keep pace
with the technological advances that made deepwater oil exploration and
production possible.55 The WEST Engineering study also determined that
due to stronger, larger and heavier pipe necessary to conduct deepwater
blowout preventers for pressure control in the event other measures failed to adequately
control pressure).
48 See generally W. ENG’G SERVS., SHEAR RAM CAPABILITIES STUDY (2004), available at http://
www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/463/(463)%20West%20Engineering%20Final%20Report.pdf;
EARL SHANKS ET AL., DEEPWATER BOP CONTROL SYSTEMS—A LOOK AT RELIABILITY ISSUES
(2003), available at http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/Les-oilspill-ABSC.pdf; PER
HOLAND, SINTEF, RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP SYSTEMS FOR DEEPWATER APPLICATION,
PHASE II DW (1999), available at http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/319/319AA.pdf.
49 See W. ENG’G SERVS., supra note 48; SHANKS ET AL., supra note 48; HOLAND, supra note 48.
50 See SHANKS ET AL., supra note 48; HOLAND, supra note 48.
51 See HOLAND, supra note 48, at 7.
52 Id. at 85 (“All failures that occur in the BOP after the installation test are regarded as
safety critical failures.”).
53 See W. ENG’G SERVS., supra note 48, at 1-1.
54 Id. at 3-1.
55 Id.
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drilling activities, such improvements would “adversely affect[ ] the ability
of a given ram BOP to successfully shear and seal the pipe in use,”56 and
further noted that “WEST is currently aware of several failures to shear
when conducting shear tests using the drill pipe that was to be used in
the well.”57
These blowout preventer shortcomings were no secret from those
conducting offshore drilling operations. The authors of a paper presented
at the 2003 Offshore Technology Conference, an industry meeting, pointed
out that “[f]loating drilling rig downtime due to poor BOP reliability is a
common and very costly issue confronting all offshore drilling contractors.”58
Third, if loss of well control was a rare occurrence then perhaps the
above reports raising blowout preventer reliability concerns might be less
disconcerting. But blowouts are not rare occurrences.59 The MMS evalu-
ated well blowouts on the Outer Continental Shelf that occurred between
1971 and 2006,60 and based on the MMS data from this study blowouts are
far from rare events.61 During the period examined there were 126 blow-
outs on the Outer Continental Shelf,62 which corresponds to one blowout
for every 246 wells drilled between 1971 and 1991,63 and one blowout for
every 387 wells drilled from 1992 through 2006.64 To put how alarming
such blowout rates are in perspective, it is worth mentioning that there
are more than 4000 wells in the Gulf of Mexico and that 700 of these are
in waters over 5000 feet deep.65
Fourth, there had been a previous, well-publicized failure of a blow-
out preventer that resulted in a massive oil spill decades before the BP
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.66 In 1979, PEMEX, the national oil com-
pany of Mexico, was drilling an exploratory well referred to as Ixtoc I in
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See SHANKS ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
59 See David Izon et al., Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Absence of Fatalities in Blowouts
Encouraging in MMS Study of OCS Incidents 1992–2006, DRILLING CONTRACTOR,
July/Aug. 2007, at 84, available at http://www.drillingcontractor.org/dcpi/dc-julyaug07
/DC_July07_MMSBlowouts.pdf.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Mouawad & Meier, supra note 43.
66 See Arne Jernelov & Olof Linden, Ixtoc I: A Case Study of the World’s Largest Oil Spill,
10 AMBIO 299 (1981).
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the Gulf of Mexico and lost pressure control.67 As the loss of control reached
a critical stage, the operators activated the blowout preventer’s shear rams
but to no avail.68 The shear rams failed to cut through and seal off the well,
and oil flowed into the Gulf of Mexico for months.69
The questionable reliance on blowout preventers as a fail-safe de-
vice is the essence of the cautionary lesson from the BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill for other technologies with the potential to wreak environmental
havoc. This massive oil spill reminds us that those employing existing and
new technologies must evaluate, understand, and put in place fail-safe mea-
sures appropriate to the level of risk presented to human health and the
environment.70 Regulators must understand technologies that have po-
tential devastating environmental consequences if things go awry and
regulate commensurate with the level of risk presented to minimize the
threats to human health and the environment. Finally, policymakers must
understand the risks associated with technology and legislate accordingly.
In the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, it is abun-
dantly clear that this fundamental lesson of thoroughly understanding
and mitigating the risks associated with sophisticated technology was
not heeded. Certainly the basic risk—that of an oil spill—was understood
by the oil industry and regulators, but despite this knowledge there was
a fundamental failure to appreciate the magnitude of the risk, which led
to the failure to have in place an appropriate plan to address the worst
case scenario: the loss of pressure control coupled with blowout preventer
failure.71 Well-documented missteps by the operators of the Deepwater
Horizon were made and the most basic efforts to mitigate catastrophic risk
ignored or performed in a slipshod fashion.72 The regulatory agency respon-
sible for overseeing deepwater oil exploration and production, the MMS,
was found wanting, as well, and was completely restructured in response.73
67 See id. at 299.
68 See id.; W. ENG’G SERVS., supra note 48, at 3–4.
69 See Jernelov & Linden, supra note 66, at 299.
70 See Latham, supra note 11, at 345.
71 See Bourne, supra note 31, at 2; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 56.
72 See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
73 See Reorganization of Title 30, Code of Federal Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,051, 61,052
(Oct. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 201–04, 206–08, 201, 212, 217–20, 227–29,
241, 243, 290, 1201–04, 1206–08, 1210, 1212, 1217–20, 1227–29, 1241, 1243, 1290). See
generally Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3302, Change of the Name of the Minerals
Management Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader
.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872.
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Finally, policymakers, even post–Exxon-Valdez, apparently did not under-
stand the magnitude of risk presented by deepwater oil exploration and
production; how could the $75 million cap on liability applicable to spills
from offshore oil exploration and drilling activities be explained?74
Certainly we do not want policies that stifle technological inno-
vation, but some technologies may present risks to human health and the
environment that are substantial and therefore require an appropriate
high level of stringent regulation. A delicate balance in regulating is there-
fore required, but one that keeps in mind risk and that the resulting reg-
ulation must be commensurate with risk.
For example, deployment of certain technologies within densely
populated urban areas could present substantial risks and thus demand a
high degree of regulation;75 or, other technologies may be subject to a strict
regulatory regime because of the risks posed to sensitive ecosystems, drink-
ing water supplies, or food sources;76 or, outright bans on some technologies
may be appropriate because they are ill-suited to certain areas;77 or, other
technologies may be unacceptable because there are no feasible measures
to mitigate their potential threat to human health or the environment.78
It is highly doubtful, for these reasons and others, for instance, that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would permit a nuclear reactor in mid-
town Manhattan or that policymakers would allow offshore oil drilling in
Monterey Bay. In any event, the point is that when it comes to existing and
new technology, it is crucial that risks be understood and appropriate mea-
sures be put in place by industry, regulators, and policymakers to address
recognized worse case environmental and human health risk scenarios.
II. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND POTENTIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PERIL
With respect to carbon capture and sequestration, hydraulic
fracturing, and geoengineering, are we at risk of ignoring the cautionary
74 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006) (limiting oil spill liability for owners and operators of
offshore drill rigs to $75 million plus removal costs).
75 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a) (2006) (citing development in urban environments as a major
impetus for regulation).
76 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (creating national policies regarding toxins and pol-
lutants in the nation’s waters).
77 See, e.g., id.
78 See, e.g., Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, 35 I.L.M. 1439, available at http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin
/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf.
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tale so vividly illustrated by the months-long BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill? That is, have or will we take the necessary steps to comprehend,
evaluate, and address the risks associated with these technologies, or are
we ignoring one of the fundamental lessons from the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster?
A. Overview of Carbon Capture and Sequestration
Carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is perhaps the most
frequently touted technology to address climate change by capturing and
then storing the carbon dioxide currently emitted from coal-fired power
plants.79 While subsurface injection of carbon dioxide is used in the oil
and gas industries to increase yields,80 the amount injected for enhanced
oil recovery (“EOR”) pales in comparison to the amounts contemplated by
CCS advocates, and long-term storage is also not a concern with EOR.81
CCS has never been deployed on a worldwide scale and, if it is to serve as
an effective technological mitigation response to climate change, it must be
used not just in the United States but globally.82 Thus, if widely adopted as
a technological response to climate change, CCS will result in the injection
of billions of tons of carbon dioxide into the earth’s subsurface each year,83
79 See Flatt, supra note 6, at 213 (noting that when it comes to addressing climate change
by reducing carbon emissions while still allowing the generation of electricity from coal,
“[t]he option that has received the most attention is . . . to sequester the carbon dioxide
produced by coal-fired emissions and prevent it from entering the atmosphere. . . . This
process, known as carbon capture and storage (CCS), can potentially remove eighty to ninety-
five percent of the CO2 emitted from power plants.”); see also MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE
OF COAL: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON CONSTRAINED WORLD
x (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal_Summary_Report.pdf
(concluding “that CO2 capture and sequestration (CCS) is the critical enabling technology
that would reduce CO2 emissions significantly while also allowing coal to meet the world’s
pressing energy needs.”). The Department of Energy is conducting basic research with the
goal of developing viable CCS technologies that can be used on a large scale basis. See
Carbon Sequestration Regional Partnerships, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fossil.energy
.gov/programs/sequestration/partnerships/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
80 See REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 38–39
(2010), available at http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/ccstf/CCSTaskForce
Report2010.pdf.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 19 (“Globally, CCS can play a major role in reducing GHG emissions, with
20–40 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2050 projected to be suitable for capture—
including 30–60 percent of all emissions from electric power.”).
83 See id. at 23–25 (discussing various projections of worldwide CCS deployment by the
year 2050).
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which makes it imperative we understand the process and the risks that
it entails.
1. The CCS Process
CCS involves several steps: the separation and capture of carbon
dioxide before it is emitted into the atmosphere, then transporting the
captured carbon dioxide from the emission source, and then lastly inject-
ing it deep underground.84 A range of industrial activities emit carbon
dioxide, but “its application to coal-fired power plant emissions offers the
greatest potential for GHG reductions.”85 Consequently, the proponents of
CCS target application of this technology toward the coal-fired electric
power industry and not the other industrial sectors with substantial carbon
dioxide emissions.86
There are several methods to separate and capture carbon dioxide
from coal-fired power plants. Each method has its advantages and disad-
vantages in terms of cost, applicability to existing facilities, and amount
of energy required.87 Pre-combustion separation is feasible for plants that
use a newer technology, the integrated gasification combined cycle process,
to generate electricity from coal.88 Post-combustion separation and capture
can be used at existing coal-fired power plants,89 and a third process that
involves burning coal with pure oxygen or “oxy-combustion” is another
method that can be used to separate and capture carbon dioxide from
coal-fired power plants.90
Once the carbon dioxide is separated from the emission stream
and captured, it then requires transportation from the source to its final
sequestration area.91 The most likely candidate for captured carbon dioxide
84 See id. at 27.
85 Id. at 7.
86 See REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,
supra note 80, at 28; see also Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to CCS:
The Evolving Legal and Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29
ENERGY L.J. 421, 432 (2008) (“[T]he current focus has shifted to the possibility of cap-
turing carbon dioxide from coal-fired electricity generating facilities. This change of focus
is due of course to the large role played by coal-fired power plants in overall CO2 emissions.
Coal is recognized as the single largest contributing fuel source to global CO2 emissions.”).
87 See generally REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE, supra note 80, at 28–31.
88 See id. at 29.
89 See id. at 29–30.
90 See id. at 30.
91 See id. at 27.
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transportation is a network of pipelines similar to the networks used to
transport natural gas, which would require high pressure compression
of the carbon dioxide to facilitate.92 While pipelines currently exist to trans-
port carbon dioxide for use in EOR operations,93 CCS will require con-
struction of a substantial new pipeline network dedicated to this effort to
mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change while allowing the
continued use of coal.94
After the carbon dioxide is separated, captured, and transported,
it requires long-term storage or sequestration to keep it from exacerbating
anthropogenic climate change by escaping into the atmosphere.95 Several
subsurface formations are considered suitable for long-term sequestration.96
First, depleted oil and gas formations offer long-term storage capabilities,
since such formations already successfully contained large amounts of oil
and natural gas.97 Another potential carbon dioxide injection location is
“coal seams that [are] unsuitable” for mining due to the presence of gases
such as methane,98 or other factors that make mining impractical.99 A
benefit of sequestering carbon dioxide in non-viable coal seams is that
the injected carbon dioxide may aid in the recovery of natural gas from the
formations.100 The third potential location for sequestration involves dis-
posal of carbon dioxide into non-potable saline aquifers far below ground.101
In fact, many saline aquifers are so deep below ground that it is anticipated
92 See id. at 36; Marston & Moore, supra note 86, at 435 (“For pipeline transportation, the
CO2 gas stream will be compressed to a dense phase at around 2,000 psi.”).
93 See REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,
supra note 80, at 36.
94 See id. (“Pipelines are expected . . . to be the most economical and efficient method of
transporting CO2 for future commercial CCS facilities.”).
95 See id. at F-2.
96 See Marston & Moore, supra note 86, at 437–40.
97 See id. at 437–38 (“[A]s the original oil or gas in place in the reservoir had been trapped
for millions of years prior to the commencement of production, such formations are likely
to be viewed as the best sites from the standpoint of retaining stored CO2 over lengthy—
even geological—time periods.”).
98 See id. at 439.
99 See PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33801, CARBON CAPTURE AND
SEQUESTRATION (CCS) 12 (2009) (“According to DOE, nearly 90% of U.S. coal resources
are not mineable with current technology, because the coal beds are not thick enough, the
beds are too deep, or the structural integrity of the coal bed is inadequate for mining.”).
100 See Marston & Moore, supra note 86, at 439; see also FOLGER, supra note 99, at 12
(“Carbon dioxide injected into permeable coal seams could displace methane, which could
be recovered by wells and brought to the surface, providing a source of revenue to offset
the costs of CO2 injection.”).
101 See Marston & Moore, supra note 86, at 439.
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that once injected, the carbon dioxide would remain in a supercritical state
and thus less likely to migrate.102
2. CCS Risks
Storing billions of tons of carbon dioxide long-term is not without
risk to human health and the environment.103 The risks that CCS pre-
sents include those associated with a sudden release of a large volume
of carbon dioxide, which is toxic to humans and animals in sufficient
concentrations.104 Specifically if such a large release occurred, it “would
pose significant risks for asphyxiation to humans and animals in sur-
rounding areas.”105
There are at least three possible sources of a major carbon dioxide
release associated with CCS. One source of a potential catastrophic re-
lease is the well through which the captured carbon dioxide is injected.106
Abandoned wells, that were previously put in place but are no longer in
use and could also allow carbon dioxide to escape from the subsurface after
injection, are another potential release source.107 A third potential source
of a release, based on the oil and gas industry experience, is the pipeline
that is used to transport carbon dioxide to the ultimate injection location.108
Some have asserted that the risk of a massive, fatal release of
carbon dioxide from a CCS project is remote, since injection of the cap-
tured carbon dioxide will occur under tremendous pressure, causing the
gas to form a “supercritical state” that is not likely to escape once stored
102 See id.
103 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VULNERABILITY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGIC
SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE 1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange
/emissions/downloads/VEF-Technical_Document_072408.pdf.
104 See John Fogarty & Michael McCally, Health and Safety Risks of Carbon Capture and
Storage, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 67, 67 (2010). The authors note that “[c]oncentrations of
carbon dioxide of more than 7% to 10% pose an immediate threat to human life.” Id.
105 Id.
106 See SALLY M. BENSON, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE
AND STORAGE IN UNDERGROUND GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS 9 (2004), available at http://www
.pewclimate.org/docUploads/10-50_Benson.pdf.
107 See id.
108 Cf. Anahad O’Connor, Ruptured Pipeline Spills Oil Into Yellowstone River, N.Y. TIMES
(July 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/us/03oilspill.html?_r=1&scp=6&sq=
montana%20oil%20spill&st=cse (detailing a recent Exxon-Mobil pipeline rupture that
resulted in a major release of crude oil into Montana’s Yellowstone River).
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deep beneath the surface of the earth.109 Such a release, unfortunately,
does seem possible nonetheless. There have been two documented releases
of naturally occurring carbon dioxide from lakes in Cameroon in the late
1980s that resulted in fatalities.110 One release occurred in 1986 from a
natural underground reservoir beneath Lake Nyos, and in a matter of
hours it killed more than 1700 people along with numerous livestock.111
Thousands more people suffered burns when some of the carbon dioxide
reacted with water to form carbolic acid.112 The amount of carbon dioxide
involved in the Lake Nyos release was approximately the same amount
produced in a single week by one coal-fired power plant,113 which is espe-
cially alarming given the massive amounts of carbon dioxide that would
be injected into the earth if CCS is adopted on a global basis.114 Another
similar release at Lake Monoun occurred in 1988 killing 40 people.115
Not only have fatal releases of naturally occurring carbon dioxide
occurred, but releases of carbon dioxide associated with subsurface in-
jection have occurred as well.116 Consequently, the potential threat to hu-
man health that an inadvertent massive release of carbon dioxide poses
is not to be taken lightly, and is a risk worthy of significant contemplation
by CCS proponents and policymakers.
In addition to human health risk, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), among others,117 has recognized that CCS
109 See Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate Change: A Regulatory
Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (2009).
110 See Donna M. Attanasio, Surveying the Risks of Carbon Dioxide: Geological Sequestration
and Storage Projects in the United States, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,376,
10,386 (2009).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Fogarty & McCally, supra note 104, at 67.
114 See generally REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE, supra note 80, at 23–25 (discussing various projections of worldwide CCS deploy-
ment by the year 2050).
115 See Attanasio, supra note 110, at 10,386.
116 See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
43,492, 43,498 (July 25, 2008). Here, it is noted that “[a]n example of a significant CO2 leak
occurred at Crystal Geyser, Utah. CO2 and water erupted from an abandoned oil explo-
ration well due to improper well plugging. This well continues to erupt periodically and
discharges 12,000 kilotons of CO2 annually.” Id. This leak does not, however, present a
risk to human health. Id.
117 See, e.g., Allan Ingelson et al., Long-Term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in
Depleted North American Oil and Gas Reservoirs—A Comparative Analysis, 31 ENERGY
L.J. 431, 435–38 (2010).
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also presents environmental risks.118 These risks include contamination
of potable groundwater supplies caused by leaching of arsenic, lead or
other background contaminates,119 or by the presence of other chemical
contaminates in the carbon dioxide injectate,120 or by the intrusion of salt
water into groundwater from underground reservoirs.121 While perhaps
the possibility of a large scale release of carbon dioxide resulting in mass
casualties may be remote from a CCS site, “[a] more plausible risk asso-
ciated with CCS is groundwater contamination at nonperforming sites.”122
The intended environmental benefit of CCS—keeping carbon dioxide out
of the atmosphere—could also be defeated by releases into the air from
CCS sites.123 One more environmental-related risk arising from the in-
jection of massive quantities of carbon dioxide in the subsurface includes
induced seismic activity, although proper site selection may minimize
this risk.124
3. CCS Federal Regulation Summary
At the federal level, CCS is subject to regulation under the Safe
Drinking Water Act,125 which specifically authorizes the EPA to regulate
“underground injection which endangers drinking water sources.”126
118 See id.
119 See Fogarty & McCally, supra note 104, at 68 (“Injecting carbon dioxide into or near
underground aquifers leads to the formation of carbonic acid. Such acidification can dra-
matically alter water quality by increasing the leaching of contaminates such as arsenic,
lead, mercury, and organic compounds.”).
120 See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. at 43,497.
121 See id.
122 Reisinger et al., supra note 109, at 24.
123 See Sumit Som, Note, Creating a Safe and Effective Carbon Sequestration, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L. J. 961, 970 (2008) (“The atmospheric risk of CCS is that the CO2 will eventually
leak out to the atmosphere and over time exacerbate global warming.”). Id. 
124 See Reisinger et al., supra note 109, at 24.
125 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2006). The Safe Drinking Water Act in essence protects the
public health and the nation’s potable water supplies by imposing maximum contaminate
levels for a range of chemical substances. Id.
126 Id. at § 300h(b)(1) (2006). Endangerment occurs when:
Underground injection endangers drinking water sources if such in-
jection may result in the presence in underground water which supplies
or can reasonably be expected to supply any public water system of any
contaminant, and if the presence of such contaminant may result in
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Underground injection wells used for CCS are designated as “Class VI”
injection wells,127 and the owners or operators of Class VI injection wells
have eight fundamental regulatory obligations.
In sum, first, they must prepare an assessment of the geologic,
hydrogeologic, geochemical, and geomechanical properties of proposed
CCS sites to confirm that they are suitable for use.128 Second, modeling
is required of the areas that potentially could be impacted by CCS to
confirm that carbon dioxide will not migrate and contaminate underground
drinking water sources.129 An integral part of the modeling obligation is
to also develop a corrective action plan in the event the well develops
problems.130 Third, the regulations impose certain injection well construc-
tion requirements.131 Fourth, the EPA imposed specific CCS injection well
operating parameters “including injection pressure limitations, use of
down-hole shut-off systems, and annulus pressure requirements to ensure
that injection of CO2 does not endanger [underground sources of drinking
water.]”132 Fifth, the owners and operators of CCS injection wells have a
testing obligation to determine the physical and chemical characteristics
of the carbon dioxide injectate and to perform internal and external me-
chanical integrity testing of the injection wells.133 Sixth, monitoring is a
key aspect of the CCS regulatory structure and accordingly groundwater
monitoring is required,134 along with monitoring of the carbon dioxide
plume.135 Seventh, the results of testing and monitoring must be kept
such system’s not complying with any national primary drinking water
regulation or may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.
Id. at § 300h(d)(2) (2006).
127 Pursuant to its authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA enacted regu-
lations designating several classes of underground injection wells, Class I through V, and
to regulate CCS the EPA added another class of injection wells designated as Class VI.
See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,233
(Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144–47) (“Today’s rule defines a new
class of injection well (Class VI), along with technical criteria that tailor the existing UIC
regulatory framework to address the unique nature of [CCS].”).
128 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,247.
129 Id. at 77,248.
130 Id. at 77,250.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 77,257.
133 Id. at 77,259.
134 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,259.
135 Id. at 77,262. At the discretion of the EPA the owner or operator may also be required
to monitor the air and soil in the vicinity of the CCS site. Id. at 77,263.
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and periodically submitted electronically to regulators.136 Finally, the CCS
regulations impose postinjection well-site closure and financial assurance
obligations on site owners or operators.137
Pursuant to section 114,138 the Clean Air Act also imposes certain
record-keeping, reporting, and monitoring obligations on CCS facilities.139
In brief, the owners or operators of CCS facilities must report the amount
of carbon dioxide received and injected, the amount of any releases and
the total amount sequestered.140 Records relevant to such reporting obli-
gations must also be kept.141 Finally, the EPA requires development of a
monitoring, reporting, and verification plan that is subject to agency ap-
proval for each CCS facility.142 The basic purposes of the plan are to identify
pathways that could result in surface leaks and to detect and quantify any
leaks that may occur of sequestered carbon dioxide.143
In addition to regulating sequestration sites, the federal govern-
ment will also regulate the network of pipelines that ultimately will deliver
the captured carbon dioxide to the sequestration sites. The Department
of Transportation, through its Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, in particular the Office of Pipeline Safety, would imple-
ment this aspect of CCS regulation.144 The statutory authority to regulate
the pipeline component of CCS projects is derived from the authority
granted by Congress under the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979,145
and its implementing regulations,146 which together impose a host of pipe-
line safety, design, construction, and maintenance obligations on owners
and operators of interstate pipelines.147
136 Id. at 77,264.
137 Id. at 77,266–68.
138 Under section 114, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (2006), the EPA has broad autho-
rization to require monitoring and to request information in order to “carry out any
provision” of the Clean Air Act.
139 See id.
140 See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration
of Carbon Dioxide; 75 Fed. Reg. 75,060, 75,064–65 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 72, 78, 98).
141 See 75 Fed. Reg. at 75,067.
142 See id. at 75,065.
143 See id.
144 See Marston & Moore, supra note 86, at 449–52.
145 See 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq. (2006), see also PHMSA—State Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP. PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.phmsa.dot.gov
/pipeline/state-programs (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
146 See 49 C.F.R. pts. 190, 195–99 (2010).
147 See 49 C.F.R. pts. 192, 195.
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4. Sufficiency of CCS Regulations to Protect Human Health and
the Environment
Whether the federal CCS regulatory approach is sufficient to
prevent a BP Deepwater Horizon magnitude catastrophic event remains
to be seen. While injection of carbon dioxide is fairly commonplace to
enhance oil recovery, the scale at which CCS will be conducted as a climate
change mitigation approach will dwarf the use of carbon dioxide in EOR
operations.148 According to the Department of Energy and the International
Energy Agency, there is the potential capacity to sequester 3,000,000 mega-
tons of carbon dioxide in the United States.149 Furthermore, to effectively
address rising GHG levels that are contributing to climate change will re-
quire deployment of CCS on a global basis. The precise amount of carbon
dioxide that would be subject to sequestration around the world is difficult
to quantify,150 but as more widespread CCS is employed throughout the
world, it is far from unreasonable to expect an increase in the potential for
operational errors that could result in fatal or environmentally damaging
releases of carbon dioxide.
The primary federal regulatory program enacted by the EPA to
minimize the risk of catastrophic releases, the underground injection con-
trol program,151 is also less than comforting. Its regulatory focus is pri-
marily preventing potable groundwater contamination, an important and
laudable regulatory goal, but when it comes to regulating releases of
carbon dioxide to the air, the EPA expressly notes that “regulating such
surface/atmospheric releases of CO2 are outside the scope of this proposal
and [Safe Drinking Water Act] authority.”152
One may logically ask about the Clean Air Act’s regulatory authority
to require owners and operators of CCS projects to respond to releases. All
the EPA has implemented under this statute, however, is a record-keeping,
reporting, and monitoring obligation; the regulations governing CCS under
148 See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,496 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146).
149 See id. (“Theoretically, this capacity could be large enough to store a thousand years
of CO2 emissions from nearly 1,000 coal-fired power plants.”).
150 See id. (noting that “predictions about large-scale availability and the rate of CCS project
deployment are subject to considerable uncertainty.”).
151 See Underground Injection Control Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water
.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
152 Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. at 43,497.
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the Clean Air Act do not include an express corrective action requirement
in the event of a release.153
In terms of responding in the event that groundwater contamination
does occur, it appears that CCS presents a similar conundrum that drilling
for oil and gas in thousands of feet of ocean does. That is, if corrective ac-
tion is necessary to address groundwater contamination, how will reme-
dial measures be conducted so deep beneath the earth’s surface? What
technologies exist to remediate a major aquifer that becomes contaminated
as the result of a CCS project? None of the Federal Register announcements
discussing the regulation of CCS as Class VI injection wells provides an-
swers or discusses readily available remediation technologies,154 but remi-
niscent of the MMS regulations in place at the time of the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster, EPA requires CCS owners or operators to develop a site-
specific, risk-based emergency and remedial response plan in the event
a drinking water supply is threatened or contaminated.155
While demonstration projects examining the deployment of CCS are
underway, “because these early projects will be carried out in a variety of
jurisdictions, under a variety of (perhaps insufficient) funding mechanisms,
there is substantial risk that, despite the best intentions, these early proj-
ects could be completed without providing the scientific and technical
underpinnings needed for wide-scale deployment.”156 Put simply, despite
current CCS research and development activities, “[p]ractical experiences
with injecting CO2 for the purpose of long-term storage and empirical evi-
dence of its stability over the long term are still scant.”157 Much like the
use of fossil fuels and their impact on the environment, the fact is that
global deployment of CCS will be, to some degree, an experiment where we
wait for the results of injecting massive amounts of carbon dioxide deep
within the earth’s subsurface. No doubt as we have learned from our exper-
iment for over 100 years with fossil fuel combustion emissions and their
impacts on human health and the environment, currently unknowable,
unintended consequences are certainly possible with CCS.
153 See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration
of Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,060, 75,078–86 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 98.440–98.449).
154 See, e.g., Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geological Sequestration (GS) Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,233
(Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144–147).
155 See id. at 77,272–73.
156 INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, POLICY BRIEF, REGULATION OF CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE 19 (2008), available at http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_CCS.pdf.
157 Attanasio, supra note 110, at 10,378.
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B. Hydraulic Fracturing
Natural gas comprises approximately twenty-five percent of domes-
tic energy needs in the United States,158 and is thus a vital fuel. Proponents
of expanding natural gas use point to the fact that its combustion results
in less carbon dioxide emissions than other fossil fuels.159 It was expected,
however, that domestic natural gas supplies would not keep pace with
growing demand.160
1. Overview of Hydraulic Fracturing
That outlook of insufficient domestic supplies changed dramatically
with the so-called “unconventional natural gas revolution,”161 which has
been brought about by the recent discovery of massive natural gas reserves
thousands of feet below the earth’s surface,162 coupled with advances in
drilling technology and the use of a process called hydraulic fracturing to
coax natural gas from formations that previously were unproductive.163
This is especially true with respect to a shale formation thousands of feet
beneath the surface of the southeast and eastern United States referred
to as the Marcellus Shale formation.164 Shale gas activity involving hy-
draulic fracturing has been particularly widespread in Pennsylvania.165
However, shale gas formations are present in other parts of the country,
too, and indeed throughout the world, and hydraulic fracturing has followed
as a process.166
158 See IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., FUELING NORTH AMERICA’S
ENERGY FUTURE: THE UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION AND THE CARBON
AGENDA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2010), available at http://www2.cera.com/docs/Executive
_Summary.pdf.
159 See, e.g., id. at 5.
160 See id. at 3.
161 Id. at 1.
162 See John Manuel, EPA Tackles Fracking, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. at A199 (2010).
163 IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 158, at 4 (“The combination of
hydraulic fracturing (fraccing) and horizontal drilling has opened up vast new resources of
natural gas from shale formations and tight sandstones. These innovations have unlocked
the potential of natural gas shales that have greatly increased the potential supply of
natural gas in North America and at a much lower cost than conventional natural gas.”).
164 See Urbina, supra note 3 (noting that the Marcellus Shale formation is “roughly the size
of Greece, lies more than a mile beneath the Appalachian landscape, from Virginia to the
southern half of New York. It is believed to hold enough gas to supply the country’s energy
needs . . . for more than 15 years.”).
165 See id.
166 See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of An
Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www
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Hydraulic fracturing, also referred to as hydrofracking or fracking,
initially requires drilling a well.167 As summarized by the EPA, once the
well is drilled:
Hydraulic fracturing involves the pressurized injection of
fluids commonly made up of water and chemical additives
into a geologic formation. The pressure exceeds the rock
strength and the fluid opens or enlarges fractures in the
rock. As the formation is fractured, a “propping agent,” such
as sand or ceramic beads, is pumped into the fractures to
keep them from closing as the pumping pressure is released.
The fracturing fluids (water and chemical additives) are
then returned back to the surface. Natural gas will flow
from pores and fractures in the rock into the well for sub-
sequent extraction.168
While not a new technology, the use of hydraulic fracturing has dramati-
cally increased and is anticipated to further grow in importance as a source
of natural gas in the United States in the foreseeable future.169
.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/2010/12/10Hydraulic.pdf (noting that since 1949 “close to 2.5
million fracture treatments have been performed worldwide.”).
167 See IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 158, at 5.
168 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH
STUDY 1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf;
see also U.S. Patent No. 7,325,608 B2 col.1 l.21 (filed Aug. 31, 2006):
Hydrocarbon-producing wells are often stimulated by hydraulic fracturing
operations. In hydraulic fracturing operations, a viscous fracturing fluid,
which also functions as a carrier fluid, is pumped into a producing zone
at a rate and pressure such that the subterranean formation breaks
down and at least one fracture is formed in the zone. Typically, partic-
ulate solids, such as sand, suspended in a portion of the fracturing fluid
are then deposited in the fractures. These particulate solids, commonly
referred to as “proppant particulates,” serve to prevent the fractures from
fully closing so that conductive channels are formed through which pro-
duced hydrocarbons can flow.
The proppant particulates used to prevent fractures from fully closing
generally are particulate solids, such as sand, bauxite, ceramics, or nut
hulls, which are deposited into fractures using traditional high proppant
loading techniques.
For a short video depiction of the hydraulic fracturing process, see Extracting Natural Gas
From Rock, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/27/us
/fracking.html?hp.
169 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE PO-
TENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 8 (2011),
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2. Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing presents several potential risks to human
health and the environment.170 Because of the amounts of water required
by the hydraulic fracturing process, one environmental concern arises from
the adverse impact that withdrawing substantial quantities of water can
have on surface water and groundwater.171 Water in the range of two to
four million gallons per well is required to successfully develop shale gas
through hydraulic fracturing.172 In the United States, an estimated 35,000
wells are developed through hydraulic fracturing annually.173 Thus, each
year hydraulic fracturing may consume 70 billion to 140 billion gallons
of water, which must come from either surface water or groundwater
sources.174 Once injected, much of this water may not be recovered for
reuse.175 The EPA recognized that, depending on the region, time of year,
and weather events, the withdrawal of so much water could adversely im-
pact both the availability and quality of surface water and groundwater.176
Perhaps the most publicized risk to human health and the environ-
ment is that associated with the possible contamination of potable water
sources.177 This potential risk arises from several activities associated with
hydraulic fracturing.178 First, there is a concern that the injection of mas-
sive amounts of water mixed with chemicals could result in migration that
would adversely affect potable drinking water sources.179 Whether this is
available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload
/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711-08.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT STUDY PLAN] (stating that in
2009 shale gas supplied fourteen percent of domestic natural gas and is expected to rise
to forty-five percent of domestic supplies by 2035).
170 See Urbina, supra note 3.
171 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at 20.
172 Id. at 19.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 20.
176 See id. (“The removal of large volumes of water could stress drinking water supplies,
especially in drier regions where aquifer or surface water recharge is limited. This could
lead to lowering of water tables or dewatering of drinking water aquifers, decreased stream
flows, and reduced volumes of water in surface water reservoirs.”).
177 See, e.g., Urbina, supra note 3.
178 See David Biello, What the Frack? Natural Gas From Subterranean Shale Promises
U.S. Energy Independence—With Environmental Costs, SCI. AM. (Mar. 30, 2010), http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturing.
179 See id.
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a legitimate concern is subject to dispute because shale gas is typically
separated by thousands of feet of rock from potable water aquifers.180
However, there have been reported instances of groundwater contam-
ination associated with hydraulic fracturing. In Dimock, Pennsylvania,
for example, improperly installed wells resulted in the contamination of
drinking water wells, causing one to explode.181
The assertions that hydraulic fracturing has contaminated drink-
ing water sources in Pennsylvania are also supported by state regulatory
action.182 By letter dated October 19, 2010, the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection advised a number of Susquehanna residents
that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Cabot Oil & Gas had contam-
inated several drinking water wells while conducting hydraulic fractur-
ing operations in the Marcellus Shale formation.183
There are also a number of pending suits that allege that hydrau-
lic fracturing caused contamination of drinking water.184 In Baker v.
Anschutz Exploration Corp., for example, it is alleged that, as a result of
the defendants’ hydraulic fracturing operations conducted in upstate
New York, the “Plaintiffs can no longer drink their water because their
potable water supplies have been contaminated with combustible gases,
toxic sediments and hazardous chemicals.”185 The plaintiffs seek $150 mil-
lion in damages under a variety of legal theories, including negligence,
negligence per se, private nuisance, premises liability, strict liability, and
deceptive business practices.186
Evidence suggests potable groundwater supplies, in addition to suf-
fering potential contamination with fracturing fluids, may also be contami-
nated by natural gas—methane—that migrates unimpeded into drinking
180 See Manuel, supra note 162, at 199 (“[B]ecause groundwater supplies and natural gas
deposits are often separated by thousands of feet of rock and earth . . . it is difficult to
establish a definitive connection between contaminated drinking water and fracking.”).
181 See Biello, supra note 178.
182 See Mark D. Christiansen, Legal Developments in 2010 Affecting the Oil and Gas
Exploration and Production Industry, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. J. 177, 212–13 (2011).
183 Id. at 212.
184 See Eric Waeckerlin, The Plaintiffs’ Bar Zeros in on Fracking, FRACKING INSIDER (Feb. 2,
2011) http://www.frackinginsider.com/litigation/the-plaintiffs-bar-zeros-in-on-fracking/.
185 Complaint at ¶ 96, Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp., No. 2011-1168 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 10, 2011).
186 See id. at ¶¶ 104–196. The case was filed in state court but removed by the defendants to
federal district court. See Jon Cooperman, Well-Known Plaintiff’s Firm Files Lawsuit Against
Gas Exploration Company in Upstate New York, FRACKING INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2011) http://
www.frackinginsider.com/litigation/hydraulic-fracturing-fracking-during-natural/.
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water sources once recovery wells are put in place and the shale is
fractured. Researchers from Duke University analyzed methane levels
in drinking water wells located in areas subject to hydraulic fracturing
in Pennsylvania and New York, and compared the results with samples
from wells not located near hydraulic fracturing sites.187 The results showed
methane present in eighty-five percent of all wells tested, but average
levels of methane from the wells located near hydraulic fracturing areas
were higher than recommended action levels.188 The researchers surmised
that the methane contamination resulted from either natural gas displaced
during the hydraulic fracturing process, leaky wells, or new migration
routes created as a result of the hydraulic fracturing process.189
Spills of hydraulic fracturing fluid are another potential source of
drinking water contamination, since the large quantities of water and
chemicals are stored on-site in tanks.190 Documented spills have taken
place in Pennsylvania, and regulators have detected the presence of frac-
turing fluid in a drinking water source, the Monongahela River.191
Yet another threat to drinking water is the disposal of spent
fracturing fluids or “flowback,” either by underground injection or through
discharge following treatment by publicly owned treatment works
(“POTWs”).192 Disposal of spent hydraulic fracturing fluids through
discharge to POTWs predominates in Pennsylvania and is especially
troubling.193 The spent hydraulic fracturing fluid frequently became
contaminated with a variety of chemical substances, including naturally
occurring radium, and this radioactive substance is not susceptible to the
conventional secondary biological treatment that POTWs typically use to
treat wastewater prior to discharge in order to meet effluent limitations
and water quality standards.194 One reason why this is especially disconcerting
187 See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying
Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172–73
(2011), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/20/8172.full.pdf.
188 Id. at 8173.
189 Id. at 8175.
190 See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 229, 258 (2010).
191 See Biello, supra note 178.
192 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at 40.
193 See Joseph P. Koncelik, Ohio and Pennsylvania Debate Regulation of Hydraulic
Fracturing Wastewater, OHIO ENVTL. L. BLOG (June 9, 2011), http://www.ohioenvironmental
lawblog.com/2011/06/articles/water/ohio-and-pennsylvania-debate-regulation-of-hydraulic
-fracking-wastewater/.
194 See Urbina, supra note 3 (discussing how a number of POTWs in Pennsylvania were
receiving spent hydraulic fracturing fluids that contained levels of radioactivity up to 2122
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from an environmental and human health perspective is that the POTWs
discharge into major rivers, including the Monongahela River, a source
of drinking water for hundreds of thousands, including the City of
Pittsburgh,195 as well as into the Susquehanna River, which eventually
discharges into the Chesapeake Bay and is a source of drinking water for
greater than six million people.196 Importantly, because it is radioactive,
“[o]nce radium enters a person’s body, by eating, drinking or breathing, it
can cause cancer and other health problems, many federal studies show.”197
However, the precise impact that hydraulic fracturing may have
on drinking water supplies is difficult to ascertain for at least three
reasons. First, a wide range of commercial and industrial facilities can
adversely impact surface water and groundwater.198 Thus linking the
exact cause of contamination at a site to a specific source can be difficult.199
Second, this contamination source determination is also difficult because
the gas industry treats the composition of the fluids used in hydraulic frac-
turing as proprietary, confidential business information, so even knowing
what specific contaminates to sample for is a challenge.200 Third, there
is simply a dearth of solid research on the potential for hydraulic fractur-
ing to contaminate drinking water supplies.201 Consequently, the EPA is
undertaking, at the direction of Congress, comprehensive research into
hydraulic fracturing and drinking water supplies.202
times greater than the drinking water standard. According to the article, data on the im-
pact of radium levels in the spent hydraulic fracturing fluid sent to POTWs in Pennsylvania
is essentially nonexistent because there is no requirement to sample for such pollutants
in the treatment plants’ effluent.).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See TEX. GROUNDWATER PROT. COMM., JOINT GROUNDWATER MONITORING AND
CONTAMINATION REPORT—2004 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.tceq.state.tx.us
/assets/public/comm_exec/pubs/sfr/056_04/056_04.pdf.
199 See David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a National Goal for
State and Federal Programs, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 387, 410 (1989). 
200 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at 25 (“This makes identifying the toxicity and
human health effects associated with these chemicals difficult.”).
201 See Manuel, supra note 162, at 199.
202 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at vii (recognizing that “[a]s natural gas pro-
duction has increased, so have concerns about the potential environmental and human
health impacts of hydraulic fracturing in the United States. . . . In response to public
concern, Congress directed the United States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to
conduct research to examine the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking
water resources.”). The agency expects to issue the results of the study in 2014. See
Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic
fracturing/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
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Soil and surface water can also suffer contamination as a result
of hydraulic fracturing. In several incidents eerily reminiscent of the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, well blowouts have occurred at hydraulic
fracturing sites resulting in contamination. For example, in 2010, EOG
Resources suffered a well blowout in the Marcellus Shale formation be-
neath Pennsylvania, causing a seventy-five foot spout of fracking fluid
and natural gas.203 In April 2011, Chesapeake Energy Corp. lost control
of a well at a hydraulic fracturing site when the well’s blowout preventer
failed.204 The blowout spewed hydraulic fracturing fluid onto a nearby
property and into a creek for more than twelve hours and resulted in the
evacuation of several families.205 This incident resulted in interstate
implications, namely, the issuance of a sixty-day notice of intent to sue
under the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act by the Maryland attorney general because the creek contaminated
in Pennsylvania by the blowout discharges into the Susquehanna River,
which eventually discharges into the Chesapeake Bay.206
Another environmental risk arising from hydraulic fracturing is
air pollution. As an illustration of the significant levels of air emissions
associated with hydraulic fracturing, consider Dish, Texas, the location
of several hydraulic fracturing operations:
A set of seven samples collected throughout the town
analyzed for a variety of air pollutants . . . found that ben-
zene was present at levels as much as 55 times higher
than allowed by the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ). Similarly, xylene and carbon disulfide
(neurotoxicants), along with naphthalene (a blood poison)
and pyridines (potential carcinogens) all exceeded legal
limits, as much as 384 times levels deemed safe.207
203 See David Wethe & Asjylyn Loder, Shale Gas Well Blowout Raises Specter of New,
Onshore BP, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 7, 2010, 12:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2010-06-07/natural-gas-shale-well-blowout-raises-specter-of-next-bp-energy-markets.html.
204 Laura Legere, After Blowout, Most Evacuated Families Return to Their Homes in
Bradford County, THE SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://thetimes
-tribune.com/news/gas-drilling/after-blowout-most-evacuated-families-return-to-their
-homes-in-bradford-county-1.1135253#axzz1WpRTnwcR.
205 Id.
206 Press Release, Maryland Attorney General, Attorney General Gansler Notifies
Chesapeake Energy of the State’s Intent to Sue for Endangering the Health of Citizens
and the Environment (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2011
/050211.html.
207 Biello, supra note 178.
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The emissions sources are numerous at a hydraulic fracturing site and
include off-gassing of methane, compressors, generators, drill rigs, pumps,
and trucks.208 As part of its plan to study the environmental impacts of
hydraulic fracturing, however, air quality effects will not be evaluated
during the study.209
3. Sufficiency of Current Federal Approach to Hydraulic Fracturing
Put simply, the current federal regulatory approach is insufficient
to protect human health and the environment from the risks associated
with hydraulic fracturing. Indeed, while CCS is regulated under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, hydraulic fracturing is expressly exempt from the
reach of that statute.210
Federal policymakers have completely ignored one of the funda-
mental regulatory considerations in deciding to exempt hydraulic fractur-
ing from the underground injection control regulations of the Safe Drinking
Water Act and that is to first do no harm.211 That is, policymakers failed to
consider the precautionary principle in determining whether to exempt
hydraulic fracturing from Safe Drinking Water Act regulation.212
An illustration of the precautionary principle in environmental
regulation is the Clean Air Act, where Congress directed the EPA to de-
velop primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards if
the administrator determined that emissions of an air pollutant “cause
or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”213 Thus, under the Clean Air Act, sci-
entific certainty of harm is not a prerequisite to regulation;214 rather, the
precautionary principle applies.215 The regulatory philosophy expressed
by policymakers in the Clean Air Act is that if there is a reasonable
208 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at 55.
209 See id. at viii (“EPA recognizes that there are important potential research areas related
to hydraulic fracturing other than those involving drinking water resources, including ef-
fects on air quality. . . . These topics are outside the scope of the current study, but should
be examined in the future.”).
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
211 See David Sirota, America’s Energy Ethos: Do, Regardless of Harm, CREATORS.COM
(June 10, 2011), http://www.creators.com/opinion/david-sirota/america-s-energy-ethos-do
-regardless-of-harm.html.
212 For a more detailed discussion of the precautionary principle see infra Part III.
213 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006).
214 See id.
215 For a more detailed discussion of the precautionary principle see infra Part III.
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expectation of potential harm, the EPA may regulate and is not required
to wait for harm to materialize.216
With respect to hydraulic fracturing, policymakers have turned the
precautionary principle on its head, and are only now planning to under-
take a study of the environmental consequences of hydraulic fracturing.217
As an approach to regulation, this after-the-fact study is questionable be-
cause it is taking place years after expressly exempting hydraulic fractur-
ing from the key federal statute that could have regulated the practice of
injecting millions of gallons of water laced with chemicals under high pres-
sure into the subsurface—and did so without fully understanding the im-
pact on drinking water sources. The study is not only after-the-fact, but
it is also limited in scope; it is not a comprehensive evaluation of the envi-
ronmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing and will only consider potential
impacts to drinking water, leaving consideration of wastewater discharge,
air pollution, soil contamination, ecosystem impacts, and seismic risk for
another, yet to be determined day.218 Such an after-the-fact, piecemeal
approach to regulation is inefficient, ineffective, and will not likely result
in a regulatory regime governing hydraulic fracturing that sufficiently
protects human health and the environment.219 It is precisely such a
lackadaisical approach to regulation that resulted in the BP Deepwater
Horizon catastrophe.220
C. Geoengineering
The term geoengineering generally refers to a variety of techniques
that are under contemplation to cool the earth’s temperature as a way to
mitigate the global warming arising from the emissions of GHGs into the
216 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 3, 49 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1077, 1081, 1127.
217 See DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169, at vii.
218 See id., supra note 169, at vii, 54–56.
219 See Osborn et al., supra note 187, at 8175–76 (remarking that “[c]ompared to other
forms of fossil-fuel extraction, hydraulic fracturing is relatively poorly regulated at the
federal level. Fracturing wastes are not regulated as a hazardous waste under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, fracturing wells are not covered under the Safe Drinking
Water Act, and only recently has the Environmental Protection Agency asked fracturing
firms to voluntarily report a list of the constituents in the fracturing fluids based on the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.”).
220 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 115 (mentioning that “the Macondo
blowout was the product of several individual missteps and oversights . . . which gov-
ernment regulators lacked the authority, the necessary resources, and the technical
expertise to prevent.”).
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atmosphere.221 As the effects of climate change become more and more
apparent,222 and as the developed world fails to take decisive action to
dramatically reduce GHG emissions,223 geoengineering techniques are
receiving considerable attention as a realistic policy response.224
1. Geoengineering Overview
Several geoengineering options are under serious consideration
by scientists, but these options generally fall within two categories. One
category of geoengineering techniques involves efforts to increase “the
reflectivity, or albedo, of the Earth’s atmosphere or surface,” which would
“direct more solar radiation back towards space thus limiting tempera-
ture increases.”225 Specific techniques to increase reflectivity can be very
221 See ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 4, at 1 (“Climate engineering, or geoengi-
neering, can be defined as the deliberate large-scale modification of the earth’s climate
systems for the purpose of counteracting and mitigating anthropogenic climate change.”).
222 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 64:
Each year, the effects of climate change are coming into sharper focus.
Barely a month goes by without some fresh bad news: ice sheets and
glaciers are melting faster than expected, sea levels are rising more
rapidly than ever in recorded history, plants are blooming earlier in the
spring, water supplies and habitats are in danger, birds are being forced
to find new migratory patterns.
The odds that the global climate will reach a dangerous tipping point
are increasing.
223 See id. at 65 (noting that “[h]olding global warming steady at its current rate would
require a worldwide 60–80 percent cut in emissions, and it would still take decades for
the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to stabilize.”). On this point, the authors
conclude that “[m]ost human emissions of carbon dioxide come from burning fossil fuels,
and most governments have been reluctant to force the radical changes necessary to
reduce those emissions.” Id.
224 See id. at 65–66 (“The world’s slow progress in cutting carbon dioxide emissions and the
looming danger that the climate could take a sudden turn for the worse require policymakers
to take a closer look at emergency strategies for curbing the effects of global warming.
These strategies, often called ‘geoengineering,’ envision deploying systems on a planetary
scale, such as launching reflective particles into the atmosphere or positioning sunshades
to cool the earth.”); see also ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that “in
recent years a growing number of credible scientific bodies have engaged in more serious
deliberation to the concept of climate engineering.”).
225 BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 2, 16. Manipulating the earth’s albedo “could have
an effect on the climate system large enough to offset the gross increase in warming that
is likely over the next century as a result of a doubling of the amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere.” Victor et al., supra note 5, at 67.
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low tech, “such as painting roofs and paved areas white” instead of the
much more typical heat absorbing black.226 Other techniques to increase
reflectivity are more controversial because they involve directly manipu-
lating the earth’s climate.227
For instance, seeding clouds with sea salt on a continuous basis to
increase their whiteness and reflectivity is one such geoengineering tech-
nique under consideration.228 Another example of geoengineering to en-
hance reflectivity is to add sulfur dioxide to the atmosphere where it would
be converted into particles that would reflect sunlight, and thereby re-
duce the earth’s temperature.229 This geoengineering effort would attempt
to mimic the global cooling effect that has been observed following the
eruption of large volcanoes such as Mount Pinatubo.230 Yet another geo-
engineering approach contemplated is to reflect sunlight and cool the earth
by launching reflectors into space that would orbit between the earth and
the sun.231
A second general category of geoengineering involves efforts to re-
move carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or prevent its emission in the
first instance.232 One example of a carbon dioxide removal process has
been previously discussed and that is CCS, which removes carbon dioxide
from the emission stream of a power plant or other GHG-emitting facility
and then transports it to a site for sequestration deep beneath the sur-
face of the earth.233
226 BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 16; see also Max G. Bronstein, Readily Deployable
Approaches to Geoengineering: Cool Materials and Aggressive Reforestation, 10 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 44, 45 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he theory underlying this solution is quite
simple; lighter colors reflect more sunlight and therefore increase the planet’s reflectivity,
which, on a large scale, can result in global cooling.”). The author also notes the other addi-
tional benefits of white roofs: “white roofs keep buildings cooler. Cooler buildings reduce
energy costs and in turn lower CO2 emissions. Lower energy costs and a smaller carbon
footprint help to minimize the ‘heat island’ effect.” Id.
227 See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 2–4
(2009).
228 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 17.
229 See Lin, supra note 227, at 4.
230 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 18; see also Victor et al., supra note 5, at 68
(remarking that “[m]ost schemes that would alter the earth’s albedo envision putting re-
flective particles into the upper atmosphere, much as volcanoes do already.”).
231 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 69 (“More ambitious projects could include launching a
huge cloud of thin refracting discs into a special space orbit that parks the discs between
the sun and the earth in order to bend just a bit of sunlight away before it hits the planet.”).
232 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 10.
233 See id. at 10–11.
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Afforestation, the use of trees and other plants to reduce the levels
of carbon dioxide,234 is another carbon dioxide removal method that does
not trigger any of the environmental concerns that CCS raises. This is be-
cause afforestation merely requires the planting of trees in an area where
none have been for at least a decade.235 However, it is worth considering
that while afforestation may not be controversial from an environmental
perspective, a related difficulty is deforestation, which is occurring at a
rapid rate, and results in the release of carbon dioxide and eliminates a
natural carbon dioxide sequestration source.236
A more controversial carbon dioxide removal geoengineering
technique is the concept of ocean fertilization.237 The idea here is to add
“nutrients such as iron to the ocean” to spark an increase in phytoplankton,
which naturally take up and sequester carbon dioxide.238
2. Risks of Geoengineering
Tinkering with the climate through geoengineering is rife with
uncertainty and risk. The number of questions posed by geoengineering
raised by Michael C. MacCracken, chief climate change scientist for the
Climate Institute, bear repeating verbatim:
Is geoengineering really possible? Can all or most adverse
impacts from combustion of fossil fuels really be cancelled
out? What confidence does the scientific community have
in its understanding of all of this? How much would doing
this cost up front and over time? Who would pay for
geoengineering and actually do it? Are there any side
234 See Robert B. Jackson & James Salzman, Pursuing Geoengineering for Atmospheric
Restoration, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. Summer 2010, at 67, 73 (“Plants and other photosynthetic
organisms provide one of the oldest and most efficient ways to remove CO2 from air.”).
235 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 13. Afforestation is a particularly potent carbon
dioxide removal mechanism because “forest communities can store about 10 times more
carbon . . . than non-forest communities and for longer time periods (decades to hundreds
of years),” with added benefits of “erosion control, recreational value, wildlife habitat, and
production of forest goods.” Id.
236 See Bronstein, supra note 226, at 46 (recognizing that “every year a forest area the size
of Panama is lost. Deforestation can occur naturally through wildfires—which have been
increasing in number with global warming—but deforestation is more commonly driven
by the need for agricultural and grazing space.”).
237 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 12–13.
238 Id. at 12.
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effects of doing this? What if geoengineering is started and
it does not work as we expect—what is irreversible and
what is not? Are there winners and losers from undertak-
ing geoengineering? Who would get to decide what is done?
What are the optimal conditions for the Earth—and, if they
exist, would they simultaneously be optimal for all peoples,
for society, for plants and wildlife? Once geoengineering
started, how long would it have to continue? How soon
would decisions about geoengineering have to be made? Is
it appropriate to take additional actions to modify the
climate, even if the intent is to moderate what are nega-
tive impacts for at least some nations? Beyond the scientific,
engineering, and economic aspects, what are the moral
and ethical aspects of geoengineering, for us today and for
future generations?239
Answering these questions is difficult because geoengineering as a re-
sponse to anthropogenic climate change is in its nascent stages, and
furthermore there is a dearth of solid scientific research in the field.240
The research that has been done, however, is not particularly com-
forting about geoengineering’s potential adverse consequences. Increasing
the reflective capabilities of clouds, for instance, might disrupt regional
weather patterns in unpredictable ways.241 Whitening clouds through geo-
engineering technology could also adversely affect the marine ecosystem.242
Research also strongly suggests that intentionally reducing the
amount of sunlight to counteract a warming planet could have dramatic
adverse consequences for the hydrological cycle, potentially leading to ca-
tastrophic droughts especially in areas that are already water stressed.243
239 MICHAEL C. MACCRACKEN, WORLD BANK, BEYOND MITIGATION: POTENTIAL OPTIONS
FOR COUNTER-BALANCING THE CLIMATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RISING CONCENTRATIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, BACKGROUND PAPER TO THE 2010
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 5–6 (2009), available at http://www.climate.org/PDF
/World-Bank_Beyond-Mitigation_MacCracken.pdf.
240 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 73 (“Despite years of speculation and vague talk, peer-
reviewed research on geoengineering is remarkably scarce. . . . [T]he entire scientific liter-
ature on the subject could be read during the course of a transatlantic flight. Geoengineering
continues to be considered a fringe topic.”).
241 See MACCRACKEN, supra note 239, at 21.
242 See Cloud Whitening, HANDS OFF MOTHER EARTH, http://www.handsoffmotherearth
.org/learn-more/what-is-geoengineering/cloud-whitening/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
243 See G. Bala et al., Impact of Geoengineering Schemes on the Global Hydrological Cycle,
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7664, 7664 (2008), available at http://www.pnas.org/content
/105/22/7664.full.pdf.
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This concern is based on the observed effect that large volcanic eruptions
have had on rainfall.244 Other researchers using sophisticated modeling
have also voiced the concern that reducing the amount of sunlight reach-
ing the earth could have dire negative consequences on the hydrological
cycle resulting in widespread droughts.245 Yet another difficulty presented
by reflecting sunlight away from the earth is that it would have some neg-
ative consequences for the feasibility of reducing GHG emissions through
the increased use of solar energy as a viable alternative to fossil fuel–
derived energy production.246
Use of sulfates to reflect sunlight is also a problematic geoengineer-
ing option because of the adverse impacts that adding additional sulfates
to the atmosphere entails.247 These adverse impacts include destruction
of the ozone layer,248 acid rain,249 and the inability to counteract or re-
trieve the sulfates from the atmosphere once they are released.250 Of
course, adversely impacting the ozone layer has demonstrable negative
consequences for human health since the ozone layer shields us from the
sun’s harmful ultraviolet radiation.251 Similarly, increased acidity in pre-
cipitation has negative consequences for ecosystems, such as the forest
die-offs that occurred in the northeastern United States as a result of the
so-called acid rain phenomenon, triggered by sulfur dioxide emissions
from midwestern coal-fired power plants.252
244 Following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 some researchers noted “large hydro-
logical responses, including reduced precipitation, soil moisture, and river flow in many
regions.” Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, BULL. OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 2008, at 14, 15. Similar disruptions to the hydrological cycle
adversely affecting rainfall have been observed following other volcanic eruptions. Id.
245 See, e.g., Bala et al., supra note 243, at 7668 (concluding based on modeling that geo-
engineering techniques aimed at reducing the amount of sunlight striking earth “will lead
to a reduction in global mean precipitation and evaporation.”); Robock, supra note 244, at 15
(recalling that at the 2007 meeting of the American Geophysical Union “researchers pre-
sented preliminary findings from several different climate models that simulated geoengi-
neering schemes and found that they reduced precipitation over wide regions, condemning
hundreds of millions of people to drought.”).
246 See Robock, supra note 244, at 16 (noting that even “as little as a 1.8 percent reduction
in incoming solar radiation . . . would significantly affect the radiation available for solar
power systems—one of the prime alternative methods of generating clean energy.”).
247 See Lin, supra note 227, at 4.
248 See id.
249 See Robock, supra note 244, at 16.
250 See id. at 17.
251 See MACCRACKEN, supra note 239, at 18–19.
252 See id. at 20 (remarking that atmospheric addition of “sulfates would also be likely to
have adverse health consequences, reduce visibility, and increase acidic deposition (‘acid
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Ocean fertilization, which is another geoengineering technique un-
der consideration, too, presents risks. One risk is that fertilizing the ocean
with iron or other chemical substances will unintentionally affect the ma-
rine ecosystem with disastrous results, given the critical importance of
phytoplankton in the food chain.253 Another risk is that ocean fertilization
may not lead to a reduction in GHGs through increased uptake by phyto-
plankton, but may actually increase GHG emissions.254 Increased ocean
acidification is also one the observed negative consequences of climate
change,255 and it is already having a demonstrated impact on the world’s
oceans.256 Consequently, there is also a concern that ocean fertilization
could exacerbate the acidity problem that is already taking place as a result
of climate change.257
In addition to the specific risks attendant to certain geoengineering
techniques under consideration, there are risks in general associated with
geoengineering technologies that are worthy of contemplation. The tech-
nologies themselves, for example, may have inherent adverse environ-
mental consequences.258 Further, what would occur if a geoengineering
technology suddenly failed or malfunctioned? Some scientists believe that
if such an event occurred then potentially catastrophic rapid warming
would result.259
rain’) that would need to be considered in comparison to the impacts of the warming that
is averted.”).
253 See Lin, supra note 227, at 7 (recognizing that “ocean fertilization schemes risk signifi-
cant alteration of marine ecosystems. Phytoplankton form the foundation of marine food
webs, and changes in their populations could lead to unpredictable changes in ecosystems.”).
254 See Lin, supra note 227, at 7 (noting that ocean fertilization could increase the release
of methane, which is a potent GHG); BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 13.
255 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 69 (noting with respect to GHG emissions that “much
of that carbon dioxide ends up in the oceans, where it forms carbonic acid.”); see also Robock,
supra note 244, at 15 (stating that approximately fifty percent of excess atmospheric carbon
dioxide is removed by the oceans).
256 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 69.
257 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 13.
258 See Robock, supra note 244, at 16–17 (asserting that “[a]ny system that could inject
aerosols into the stratosphere . . . would cause enormous environmental damage. The
same could be said for systems that would deploy sun shields.”).
259 See Bala et al., supra note 243, at 7664 (noting that studies have found that “a failure
of the geoengineering scheme could lead to rapid climate change, with warming rates up
to 20 times greater than present-day rates.”); Robock, supra note 244, at 17 (“Such an abrupt
shift would result in rapid climate warming, which would produce much more stress on
society and ecosystems than gradual global warming.”).
66 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:31
While currently there is mounting pressure for developing coun-
tries in particular to reduce GHG emissions,260 what happens to that grow-
ing sense of urgency if geoengineering becomes a reality and successfully
serves to mitigate against the harmful effects of climate change? Some fear
that successfully implementing geoengineering technology would elimi-
nate much of the incentive to dramatically reduce GHG emissions, and the
world’s energy demands would remain fossil fuel–based.261 This is a prob-
lematic general risk because even if geoengineering were successful at
ameliorating many of the adverse consequences associated with a warm-
ing planet, the continued emissions of GHGs would result in further ocean
acidification.262 This in and of itself is an evolving environmental disaster
for the marine ecosystem.263
What are the unintended consequences of geoengineering? Much
like we have since discovered from emitting billions of tons of GHGs annu-
ally into the atmosphere, resulting in the unintended consequences we
call climate change,264 there very likely will be unintended consequences
associated with geoengineering.265 No matter how much research is con-
ducted by scientists at preeminent research centers, and no matter how
much funding is directed towards geoengineering, these unintended con-
sequences will simply remain unknown until we embark on what is essen-
tially a massive experiment on a global scale, if geoengineering is seriously
pursued as a climate change remedy.266 The global climate and all of its
260 See Ambuj D. Sagar et al., Climate Change, Energy, and Developing Countries, 7 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 71, 91 (2006).
261 See Robock, supra note 244, at 17 (recognizing that “[i]f humans perceive an easy techno-
logical fix to global warming that allows for ‘business as usual,’ gathering the national
(particularly in the United States and China) and international will to change consumption
patterns and energy infrastructure will be even more difficult.”). The author goes on to
state that “[t]his is the oldest and most persistent argument against geoengineering.” Id.
262 See Bala et al., supra note 243, at 7668 (“Geoengineering of this kind will not mitigate
the harmful effects of ocean acidification because the geoengineered world would still have
higher concentration of atmospheric CO2.”).
263 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 69 (noting that “[o]cean acidification is a catastrophe
for marine ecosystems, for the 100 million people who depend on coral reefs for their
livelihoods, and for the many more who depend on them for costal protection from storms
and for biological support of the greater ocean food web.”).
264 See id. at 76 (commenting that we “have already engaged in a dangerous geophysical
experiment by pumping massive amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.”). Unfortunately, since we have not taken the steps necessary to
dramatically curb GHG emissions, this grand experiment continues today unabated.
265 See id. at 76; see, e.g., Lin, supra note 227, at 4–5.
266 See Robock, supra note 244, at 17 (“Scientists cannot possibly account for all of the com-
plex climate interactions or predict all of the impacts of geoengineering. . . . With so much
at stake, there is reason to worry about what we don’t know.”).
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interconnections form a phenomenally complex, highly intertwined web
that, as climate change illustrates, we struggle to understand.267 In light
of this complexity and interconnectedness, precisely what intentional man-
ipulation of the climate will unleash is pregnant with uncertainty and
remains to be seen.268
Lastly, what if geoengineering technology fell into the wrong
hands? Could it become a new weapon of war by a hostile regime or the
latest threat of mass destruction offered by some terrorist organization?
Indeed, the first forays into geoengineering were not focused on protect-
ing humankind from the ravages of climate change.269 Rather, during the
Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union looked to geoengineering
as a possible component of warfare.270 If appropriate safeguards are not
in place, it is not farfetched to believe that geoengineering could be put to
intentionally harmful uses, such as inflicting a prolonged heat wave or
drought on a country or region with devastating effects.271
3. Regulation of Geoengineering
Presumably because the sophisticated geoengineering technologies
are far from ready for full-scale deployment, there are no federal statutes
or regulations that specifically govern their use.272 Policymakers have held
hearings to discuss federal research needs and governance issues that geo-
engineering necessitates;273 however, if and when any federal legislation
will be enacted remains to be seen.
The one-time focus by the Soviet Union and the United States on
geoengineering as a possible adjunct to warfare did result in the adoption
by the United Nations of a treaty that requires consideration here.274 This
treaty, The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, was adopted by the United
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 66.
270 See id.
271 See id. at 72 (recognizing that some geoengineering technologies could be utilized by
individuals). Thus given the times that we live in, where airplanes have been used as a
weapon of mass destruction, it is certainly conceivable that geoengineering has the
potential to serve as a tool of sophisticated terrorists.
272 See Jackson & Salzman, supra note 234, at 71 (“Indeed, there are no regulatory mecha-
nisms in place, domestically or internationally, that explicitly address geoengineering.”).
273 See, e.g., ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 4.
274 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 66–67.
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Nations in 1976.275 It explicitly prohibits “military or any other hostile use
of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any
other State Party.”276 The Convention defines “environmental modification
technique” as “any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipu-
lation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or
of outer space.”277
It has been suggested that the Convention might serve as a legal
impediment to the implementation of geoengineering technology, espe-
cially if widespread international agreement is not reached concerning
its deployment.278 The Convention does, however, allow for the use of so-
called environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.279 It
thus should not serve as an insurmountable hurdle to the implementation
of geoengineering technology to combat climate change, assuming broad-
based international consensus is reached concerning its implementation.280
III. GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Discerning how to better regulate emerging technologies from an
environmental perspective, in order to minimize the risk of another ca-
tastrophe similar in magnitude to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
that raged for several months, raises a number of questions. For instance,
what assurances do we have that the risks associated with CCS, hydraulic
fracturing, geoengineering, and other yet to be heard of technologies that
will follow are adequately understood? How sure are we that appropriate
275 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333.
276 Id. at art. I.
277 Id. at art. II.
278 See MACCRACKEN, supra note 239, at 27 (asserting that “it would not be far-fetched to
argue that this treaty might well not permit geoengineering schemes to be used for the pur-
pose of climate change . . . (indeed, not changing climate patterns is specifically mentioned
as being covered in one of the understandings of the treaty).”).
279 See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, supra note 275, at art. III, § 1 (“The provisions of this Convention
shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes
and shall be without prejudice to the generally recognized principles and applicable rules
of international law concerning such use.”).
280 For other international agreements that geoengineering may implicate, see BRACMORT
ET AL., supra note 12, at 30–35.
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measures have or will be taken to address those risks? How do we balance
the need for technological innovation as a remedy for climate change and
other environmental risks, while at the same time adequately regulating
to protect human health and the environment without overly burdening
technological innovation and creativity? Similarly, how do we effectively
regulate technological innovations, such as deepwater drilling, and at the
same time assure that our current energy needs are met? How much risk
are we willing to accept in an effort to combat the adverse consequences of
climate change?
Such questions allow for no easy, readily available answers. Simply
banning the technologies discussed above as a response to the risks they
pose is not an adequate answer for multiple reasons.281 Considering hydrau-
lic fracturing as an example, a ban would be difficult to impose because hy-
draulic fracturing has, in a few short years, become a widespread practice
in the natural gas industry.282 It also provides gainful employment for over
one million people who would likely join the rolls of the unemployed if a ban
were imposed.283 That makes prohibition a quite distasteful option in this
era of persistently greater than nine percent unemployment in the United
States.284 Another practical difficulty with a ban is that the natural gas pro-
vided by hydraulic fracturing provides a substantial part of our energy
needs.285 Furthermore, as a fuel, natural gas emits less carbon dioxide and
other GHGs, so its use is perceived as a beneficial alternative to other fossil
fuels.286 Finally, and more generally, these technologies either exist or are
under serious consideration as viable responses to combat the ravages of
climate change and thus merit proactive contemplation of how to best go
about regulating them.
What is needed is a thoughtful regulatory approach to CCS,
hydraulic fracturing, geoengineering, and similar technologies that may
281 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 75 (remarking with respect to geoengineering that
“[f]iddling with the climate to fix the climate strikes most people as a shockingly bad idea”).
282 See Urbina, supra note 3 (noting that around ninety percent of the 493,000 active natural
gas wells in 2009 utilized hydraulic fracturing).
283 See FracInDepth, ENERGY IN DEPTH (Sept. 1, 2001, 11:12 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/
20110704131804/http://www.energyindepth.org/in-depth/frac-in-depth/energy-and-economic
-benefits/ (stating that the natural gas industry directly employs over 1.2 million people).
284 See News Release, Bureau of Labor & Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment
Situation—July 2011 (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf
/empsit.pdf (containing a graph depicting unemployment rates persistently above nine
percent since July 2009).
285 See Manuel, supra note 162, at 199 (stating that “[n]atural gas provides almost 25%
of the U.S. energy supply and could provide 50% by 2035”).
286 See IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 158, at 5.
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emerge and carry with them significant environmental risks. As a soci-
ety, we should not want to see another BP Deepwater Horizon magnitude
environmental disaster arising from the use of sophisticated technolo-
gies. To that end, I offer several guiding regulatory principles for contem-
plation below.
A. The Precautionary Principle
First, policymakers must keep in the forefront as they develop
environmental regulatory regimes governing these emerging technologies
the precautionary principle. This bedrock principle of environmental
regulation, much akin to medicine’s Hippocratic Oath that commands
physicians to first do no harm,287 requires policymakers to “[a]void steps
that will create a risk of harm. Until safety is established, be cautious . . .
In a catchphrase: better safe than sorry.”288
With this core regulatory principle in mind, major efforts are re-
quired by policymakers and regulators to understand knowable risk.289
While risk cannot be completely eliminated, it could be that some tech-
nologies may simply present too much risk and are suitable only for
unpopulated areas, or areas that already suffer from environmental deg-
radation such as brownfield sites,290 or if the risks are such that we should
either judicially or legislatively subject the parties who utilize them to
strict liability if harm ensues,291 or perhaps the risks are so great that
287 See Greek Medicine—The Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html.
288 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003–04
(2003); see also Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996) (“Few principles are better ensconced in the law and phi-
losophy of environmentalism than is the ‘precautionary principle.’ ”).
289 See, e.g., Ragnar E. Löfstedt et al., Precautionary Principles: General Definitions and
Specific Applications to Genetically Modified Organisms, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS MGMT. 381,
386–87 (2002).
290 See Brownfields and Land Revitalization, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov
/brownfields/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (defining brownfields as “real property, the
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. Cleaning up and
reinvesting in these properties protects the environment, reduces blight, and takes
development pressures off greenspaces and working lands.”).
291 See Teresa A. Berwick, Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Damage: A
Roadmap for International Environmental Regimes, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 264
(1997) (explaining the endorsement of strict liability for an international liability standard).
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use of a particular technology should be banned altogether,292 despite the
difficulties previously mentioned regarding such severe regulatory action.
Alternatively, keeping true to the precautionary principle as a guide may
mean that certain technologies may be put to use only if the risks of climate
change or some other environmental calamity outweigh the risks atten-
dant to a potential mitigating technology, such as geoengineering.293
Admittedly, as Cass Sunstein and others have pointed out, there
are inherent difficulties in applying the precautionary principle since “it
offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of
action, including regulation. Taken seriously, it is paralyzing, banning the
very steps that it simultaneously requires.”294 Although the precaution-
ary principle has been criticized for its elegant simplicity among other
reasons,295 its basic lesson remains valid and applicable to regulating in
the face of uncertainty. That is, it teaches us to proceed with caution,
especially in the face of potential catastrophic risks.296
If this basic precautionary principle lesson were applied in the
context of hydraulic fracturing, as an example, it would require Congress
to direct the EPA to first conduct a comprehensive, thorough study of the
risks to human health and the environment associated with the hydraulic
fracturing process.297 Following the completion and digestion of the study
292 See, e.g., Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,675, 69,676 (Dec. 30, 1993)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (as an example of the United States banning a particular
substance and practice for its environmental risks pursuant to the Clean Air Act).
293 See Cross, supra note 288, at 852.
294 Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 850 (2006).
As an illustration of this difficulty with the precautionary principle, Sunstein discusses
the dilemma posed by drug regulation, where strict adherence to the precautionary prin-
ciple may protect people from the unknown harms associated with new drugs but at the
same time prevent access to disease-curing or life-saving drug therapies. See id. at 851.
295 See, e.g., id. at 848 (noting that one such difficulty is defining with precision exactly
what the precautionary principle is, since “there are twenty or more definitions . . . and
they are not all compatible with one another.”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 498–501 (2008) (summarizing some of
the criticism that the precautionary principle has been subjected to over time).
296 See Sunstein, supra note 294, at 892 (arguing that “a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle . . . is a coherent and defensible part of environmental policy” which would take
into account appropriate safety margins, and asserting that “[i]ndeed, such a principle
might well be the best understanding of the Precautionary Principle itself. It has many
uses, not only in environmental policy but in health and safety regulation as a whole,
including the war on terrorism.”).
297 Cf. Cross, supra note 288, at 862 (stating “policymakers should confront the scientific
uncertainty and act prudently . . . with the best possible scientific understanding . . . but
only after considering the potentially substantial risks attendant to precaution.”).
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results, then the EPA would develop appropriate regulations specific to
the risks established by the study.298 Assuming that the risks were man-
ageable and deemed not too great, only then would the activity be allowed.
Instead, federal policymakers have cast aside the precautionary
principle by expressly exempting hydraulic fracturing from the Safe
Drinking Water Act.299 Only now is the EPA moving to undertake a study
of the effects of hydraulic fracturing, after thousands of hydraulic frac-
turing operations have taken place and the concerns about the environ-
mental and human health effects have mounted.300 Moreover, the planned
study that the EPA will undertake is flawed from the perspective of the pre-
cautionary principle because the primary focus is on the impact hydrau-
lic fracturing may have on drinking water supplies.301 The other adverse
consequences of hydraulic fracturing are not included, but perhaps they
will be the subject of further study at some undetermined point in the
future.302 This backwards regulatory approach to hydraulic fracturing—
first allowing the activity to proceed, then years after the fact determin-
ing the risks presented, and then only on a limited basis—flies in the face
of the precautionary principle. By the time the EPA completes its study,
the potential harm to groundwater, other media, and possibly to human
health will continue throughout the country where natural gas is produced
through hydraulic fracturing and may be difficult to reverse.303
This “wait and see what happens” approach to regulation is unfor-
tunate in the context of hydraulic fracturing and cannot suffice for a
regulatory framework for CCS or geoengineering. The risks are too great,
and this is especially true regarding geoengineering.304 It may involve
promising technologies; however, those technologies come with the un-
certain potential to catastrophically transform the global environment.
298 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 288, at 1014 (discussing levels of regulation that could
be implemented based on the level of risk due to unknown adverse effects).
299 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
300 See generally DRAFT STUDY PLAN, supra note 169.
301 See id. at vii, 54–56 (defining the scope of the study as “the relationship between hy-
draulic fracturing and drinking water resources” and further determining that any impact
on air quality, whole ecosystems, seismic activity, and public safety are outside the scope
of the study).
302 See id. at 54.
303 See EPA, supra note 202 (stating that the goal deadline of the hydraulic fracturing study
is 2014). See generally Urbina, supra note 3 (discussing the potential harms to groundwater
and human health by the hydraulic fracturing practice).
304 See generally Fogarty & McCally, supra note 104 (discussing the health and safety risks
of CCR); Victor et al., supra note 5 (discussing the risks of geoengineering).
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It very well may be that the cure turns out to be far worse than the disease
unless, before allowing for CCS or geoengineering to occur, adequate re-
search is undertaken to establish the knowable range of risks followed by
appropriate regulations to manage the most significant threats presented.
B. International Cooperation
Because these emerging technologies can potentially have cross-
border adverse impacts,305 a substantial degree of international cooper-
ation is required to develop broad understanding of the risks posed and
effective regulation in response to those risks.306 It is not inconceivable that
a CCS project located in upstate New York could adversely impact a source
of drinking water shared with Canada. Similarly, hydraulic fracturing
operations conducted in southern Texas could conceivably impact north-
ern Mexico. Certainly any negative consequences of geoengineering could
reach around the globe if this effort to mitigate climate change were to
come to fruition and go awry.307 Only a collective, coordinated international
approach, involving shared expertise from around the world, can achieve
the best possible understanding of the risks and serve as a basis for sound
policy approaches responsive to the environmental risks of these emerging
technologies.308 The importance of a coordinated international approach
is especially relevant when it comes to much-needed scientific research
regarding these emerging technologies.309
305 See David Ellyard, Geoengineering: Can It Help Our Planet Keep Its Cool?, AUSTRALIAN
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, http://www.science.org.au/nova/123/123print.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
306 See Richard Benedick, Considerations on Governance for Climate Remediation
Technologies: Lessons from the “Ozone Hole,” 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 6, 7 (2011).
307 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 71–72.
308 See id. at 73.
309 See id. at 73, where the authors note, concerning geoengineering:
The scientific academies in the leading industrialized and emerging
countries—which often control the purse strings for major research
grants—must orchestrate a serious and transparent international
research effort funded by their governments. Although some work is
already underway, a more comprehensive understanding of geoengineer-
ing options and of risk-assessment procedures would make countries
less trigger-happy and more inclined to consider deploying geoengi-
neering systems in concert rather than on their own.
Although the authors mention the above in the context of geoengineering, the same can
be said for CCS and hydraulic fracturing, too.
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To some extent this cooperative international approach is under-
way by policymakers.310 Such discussions have already occurred, in fact,
between the United Kingdom and the United States with respect to
geoengineering.311
C. International Governance
Further, international cooperation is particularly critical with re-
spect to geoengineering in order to develop an appropriate governance
structure. This is because these technologies have the potential to adverse-
ly impact the entire globe.312 If for no other reason, some international gov-
ernance regime is required as a check on countries from acting in their
best interests to the possible detriment of others. As MacCracken posits:
Wanting to sustain its use of fossil fuel derived energy . . .
might China act unilaterally if it became convinced that
global warming was leading to sharp disruption of the life-
sustaining monsoons on which it depends? If the US be-
came convinced that global warming was leading to more
and more powerful hurricanes that were devastating its
Southeast, might it choose to act unilaterally?313
The specter of possible unilateral action in deploying geoengineering tech-
nologies is troubling because it “could impose costs on other countries,
such as changes in precipitation patterns and river flows or adverse
impacts on agriculture, marine fishing, and tourism.”314 Consequently,
technologies that possess such planet-altering capabilities must not be
unilaterally used. Given that they are capable of inflicting life-altering
harms on other nations, international consensus is a required prerequi-
site to their development and use.315
310 See Eli Kintisch, House Science Panel to Lead International Effort on Geoengineering, SCI.
INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2009, 5:24 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/11/house
-science-p.html.
311 See ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE, supra note 4, at 43.
312 See, e.g., Victor et al., supra note 5, at 71–72.
313 MACCRACKEN, supra note 239, at 27.
314 Victor et al., supra note 5, at 71–72.
315 See Lin, supra note 227, at 14–15 (stressing that “a system of geoengineering gov-
ernance should be adopted to oversee geoengineering research efforts, address potential
unilateral geoengineering deployment, and establish a mechanism to make collective
decisions on any future geoengineering efforts.”).
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Certainly establishing an acceptable international governance
regime that would oversee geoengineering, and other emerging technolo-
gies with global environmental risk, presents a recognized challenge. All
one needs to do is consider the lack of success among nations in develop-
ing a meaningful international consensus in Copenhagen around what
actions are necessary by the global community in order to combat climate
change.316 Nonetheless, contemplating the establishment of some inter-
national governance mechanism is a critical aspect of an effective regula-
tory approach to emerging technologies that present global environmental
risk, such as geoengineering. This international governance mechanism
may be as straightforward as a new treaty specifically governing geoengi-
neering and other similar technologies.317 Alternatively, from a global gov-
ernance perspective, it might take the form of a new international body
charged with the oversight of these technologies. If such an international
body were developed, it could serve as a cooperative clearinghouse for
research, development, and deployment of technologies that present sub-
stantial global environmental risk, as well as provide a forum to resolve
disputes, such as claims of harm arising from the use of these environ-
mentally risky technologies.318
D. The States and the Federal Government
The classic environmental regulatory approach in the United
States currently involves a patchwork of state laws governing emerging
technologies, such as CCS and hydraulic fracturing.319 This approach re-
quires reconsideration in light of the significant potential extraterritorial
316 See Navroz K. Dubash, Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust, ECON. & POLITICAL WKLY.,
Dec. 26, 2009, at 8, 10–11, available at http://files.tiggroups.org/92473/get-web/Copenhagen
_EPW_Navroz_K_Dubash.pdf.
317 See Lin, supra note 227, at 15. The author notes that the possible international gov-
ernance of geoengineering “seems to fall logically within the purview of the [United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change],” but also points out that reliance on this key
climate change treaty is not problem free. Id. at 15–16.
318 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 74–75 (“Although the international scientific community
should take the lead in developing a research agenda, social scientists, international lawyers,
and foreign policy experts will also have to play a role. Eventually, there will have to be
international laws to ensure that globally credible and legitimate rules govern the deploy-
ment of geoengineering systems.”).
319 For an overview of some of the state regulations applicable to CCS, see Allan Ingelson
et al., Long-Term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Depleted North American
Oil and Gas Reservoirs—A Comparative Analysis, 31 ENERGY L.J. 431, 441–47 (2010),
and for a similar summary of state law applicable to hydraulic fracturing, see Hannah
Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production
and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 157–67 (2009).
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harm to the environment that is at stake. This was illustrated by the hy-
draulic fracturing blowout that occurred in Pennsylvania, which prompted
the State of Maryland to issue a notice of intent to sue under federal envi-
ronmental laws.320 As this showed, the environmental risks associated with
CCS, hydraulic fracturing, and geoengineering can certainly cross state
lines.321 Of course, geoengineering presents the possibility of wreaking un-
intended havoc around the world.322
Domestically, this calls for a unified regulatory approach that only
the federal government can provide, instead of state-by-state regulation.
Thus, as federal regulations evolve to meet the environmental challenges
posed by these emerging technologies, Congress should consider expressly
preempting inconsistent or less stringent state laws, as it did regarding
the regulation of mobile source emissions under the Clean Air Act.323
Perhaps a more palatable approach, since Congress generally loathes
express preemption of state laws, would be based on a cooperative feder-
alism model, which would allow states to seek delegation of federal pro-
grams as they emerge to regulate new environmental technologies such
as CCS, hydraulic fracturing, or geoengineering. Congress and the states
certainly have successfully taken the cooperative federalism route in the
implementation of several existing key environmental laws and could
adopt a similar approach for hydraulic fracturing, CCS, and some aspects
of geoengineering.324
As an added benefit, a uniform federal approach governing CCS,
hydraulic fracturing, geoengineering, and other emerging technologies
of the future will prevent a race to the bottom.325 That is, it will prevent
states from enacting few, if any, regulations governing these technologies
in order to reap the economic gains potentially attendant to attracting busi-
nesses engaged in high environmental impact industries, including CCS,
hydraulic fracturing, and geoengineering.326 A uniform federal approach
320 See Press Release, Maryland Attorney General, supra note 206.
321 See, e.g., id.
322 See, e.g., Victor et al, supra note 5, at 72.
323 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (expressly preempting states from regulating motor
vehicle tailpipe emissions).
324 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (delegating the national pollutant
discharge elimination system permitting system to states); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300g-2 (2006) (delegating to the states responsibility for enforcing public water
supply regulations); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006)
(delegating to the states authority to create hazardous waste programs).
325 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective)
for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 278 (1997).
326 See id.
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to regulation should also be welcome by industry as a matter of adminis-
trative and regulatory convenience, instead of a patchwork quilt of fifty
potentially inconsistent state-based approaches to regulation.327
A high degree of sophisticated technical ability and resources are
required to gain an adequate level of understanding of CCS, hydraulic
fracturing, and geoengineering.328 States have fewer resources than the
federal government,329 and the federal government has at its disposal vast
bureaucracies populated by a wide range of expertise in many fields.330
The states simply do not have such a breadth of technical experts readily
available, and this is another reason to look for the federal government to
lead in the regulation of CCS, hydraulic fracturing, and geoengineering.
Another reason why federal law should predominate in regulating
the emerging technologies of CCS, hydraulic fracturing, and geoengineer-
ing is because of the high degree of international cooperation that is ideal
for successful regulation of these emerging technologies.331 The states have
limited, if any, authority in the international arena, while the federal gov-
ernment’s authority over international affairs is essentially boundless.332
E. The Fossil Fuel Dilemma
Each of the technologies discussed in this Article is directly related
to our highly fossil fuel-dependent energy and transportation systems.333
We permit exploration and drilling operations for oil in thousands of feet
of ocean because we require the oil to heat our homes and fuel our motor
vehicles, trains, ships, and planes.334 Policymakers and scientists are on the
brink of finding feasible the injection of billions of tons of carbon dioxide
deep under the earth’s surface because we rely so heavily around the world
327 See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating
State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1026–27 (1997).
328 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 9–12.
329 See Shari Shapiro, Who Should Regulate? Federalism and Conflict in Regulation of
Green Buildings, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 278 (2009).
330 See Stephen C. Robertson, Note, State Permitting: United States v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc. and Federal Overfiling Under the Clean Water Act, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 593, 603 (1999).
331 See Victor et al., supra note 5, at 74–75.
332 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
333 See Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of
Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 954 (2010).
334 See id.
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on coal for electricity production.335 We allow unfettered withdrawal and
ultimate high pressure injection of millions of gallons of water tainted
with undisclosed chemicals below the earth’s surface because we require
the natural gas for heat, electricity generation, and fuel or feedstocks for
other industrial processes.336 Finally, we are seriously considering, as emer-
gency mitigation measures, intentional efforts to cool the planet through
a variety of technologies to avert the climate crisis that is evolving quickly
around us.337
If we were to substantially reduce our dependence on fossil fuels,
the need for these technologies becomes greatly diminished, or perhaps not
necessary at all. If we were to radically transform our transportation sector
through the use of electric vehicles, the need for oil from deep beneath the
Gulf of Mexico lessens. If we were to radically transform how we generate
electricity by increased reliance on solar, wind, and other forms of renew-
able energy, the urgent need to pump billions of tons of carbon dioxide deep
beneath the earth to reduce the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere may
vanish along with mountaintop coal mining, too. The same may be said
with the need to fracture the shale deep within the earth to unlock recal-
citrant natural gas reserves—the need to do so disappears if we can trans-
form our economies and lives away from fossil fuels. Geoengineering? We
pull back from the brink of implementing such a risky last resort miti-
gation measure and realize the potential folly of attempting to rise to the
level of the gods through intentional efforts to manipulate the climate. All
of this is possible only if we can only break free from our fossil fuel bondage.
Thus, as a matter of regulatory policy, when scientists, engineers,
lawyers, and others who may contemplate regulating the risks attendant
to existing and emerging technologies, such as deepwater drilling, CCS,
hydraulic fracturing and geoengineering, substantial attention and re-
sources must also be devoted to transforming the world away from fossil
fuels. We cannot, as some fear, lose the sense of urgency that climate
change presents because some technology looks promising as a means of
mitigating the consequences of an inexorably warming planet. When one
considers the myriad risks to human health and the environment that our
fossil fuel dependency carries with it, moving away from them as our pre-
dominate source of fuel is an integral component of any comprehensive
public policy response to regulating emerging technologies such as CCS,
hydraulic fracturing, or geoengineering.
335 See Flatt, supra note 6, at 213.
336 See id.
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Certainly the technologies that will move us to a less carbon-
intensive future will present their own set of environmental risks and
challenges. What those risks exactly will be, we do not know; however,
what we currently do know is that our centuries-long dependence on fossil
fuels has imperiled our planet and has put at risk life on earth as we know
it. Consequently, the need to wean ourselves off fossil fuels cannot be for-
gotten as we consider how best to regulate emerging technologies.338 To
do otherwise is to completely ignore the terrible lesson of the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster, which at its core exposed the substantial risks to human
health and the environment that is just beneath the surface of our fossil
fuel addiction.
338 See Robock, supra note 244, at 17.
